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TICK, TICK, TICK...
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, A TICKING TIME
BOMB

Paul J. Piccard,- Ann M. Piccard & Mary M. Piccard

A constitutional time bomb is ticking. When it explodes, few attorneys
will be involved in the ensuing litigation but many will be called upon by
clients and friends to explain (1) what happened, (2) how it happened, and
(3) what can be done about it. The bomb was planted in the United State's
Constitution when its authors worked out a compromise on presidential
election and left us
with the old dilemma of reconciling the letter of the
199
law with its spirit.

(1) What can happen? The people's choice for President may be
defeated by the electoral college system. This happened in the elections of
1824, 1876, 1888, and probably in 1960.200
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199 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see U.S. CONST. amend. XII. See generally MAx
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160-72 (1913)

(discussing the election of the president); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1987 (Robert Famighetti ed. 1999); Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the
Union of the American States, H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 678-79, 69th Congress (Charles C.
Tansil ed. 1927).
200 See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2000, at 500 (Robert Famighetti ed.
1999) [hereinafter Famighetti].
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(2) How could a loser become the winner? The simplest case results
when a 1candidate with fewer votes nationally wins a majority of electoral
20
votes.
A second way that a loser could overtake the winner is when no
candidate receives the required majority of electoral votes. The election
would then be resolved by the United States House of Representatives,
voting by states with each state casting one vote. A majority of all the
states would be required to win. Perhaps no candidate could muster the
required 26 states and even if one did, the apparent majority might be very
tenuous. We shall examine this in more detail.2 °2
A third and more ominous possibility is that the presidential electors
might violate the spirit of our electoral system by claiming a right to vote
as they choose.20 3 This possibility will be addressed below. Fearing the
consequences of an election in the House of Representatives, or for other
reasons of their own, electors pledged to different candidates might
conspire to
elect a person who was not even running in the general
4

election.

20

(3) What can be done about this ticking bomb? Nothing short of a
constitutional amendment can stop the clock. Many amendments to
change the electoral college system have been proposed.20 5 Some have
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
202 Famighetti, supra note 2, at 500.
201
203

See THE MISSOURI COMPROMISES AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, 1820-1825, FROM

THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM PLUMER, JR. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 53, 61,
62 (Everett S. Brown ed. 1926); MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPROMISING

PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 279 (Charles F. Adams ed. 1975); James

C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over PresidentialElectors,
1962 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 497-504 (discussing when a faithless elector casts an

unauthorized vote); see also NEAL R.

PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 117

(1968) (discussing that when mandamus is issued but disobeyed, elector's vote cannot be
changed or cast differently). See literature on William Plumer a New Hampshire elector
in 1820 for a more in depth discussion.
204 Infra at 2 (discussing the possibility of electors reacting in response to their political
parties). Infra at 7 (discussing what occurs when an election is decided in the House of
Representatives).
205 See Amend the Constitution to Abolish the Electoral College System: Hearings
Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. (1951);
Nomination and Election of President and Vice President and Qualifications for Voting,
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee
of the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961); Election of the President: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. (1967); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
YEAR 1896, 111, 119 (Herman V. Ames ed. 1897) ("... more amendments have been

proposed on this subject than upon any other."); see also Michael Lind, If a Swing State
Cares, It's an Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A27; Martin Dyckman, Give Voters
Two Choices, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 3D.
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cleared either house of Congress, but not one has reached the states for
ratification since the Twelfth Amendment. We consider some possibilities
to stop the clock below.

WHAT CAN HAPPEN?

The electoral college system has produced a President regularly every
four years starting with George Washington. Sometimes the electoral vote
and the popular vote approximately coincide. At other times they diverge
as explained in further detail below. Then, the ticking bomb might
produce strange results.
There are three possibilities in a presidential election. First, a candidate
can win a majority of both popular and electoral votes and be elected
President. Second, a candidate can win a plurality (less than a majority) of
the popular vote and be elected by the electoral college. We have had
"minority" presidencies seventeen times. 20 6 Third, a candidate can win a
plurality, even a majority, of the popular vote and lose the election either
in the electoral college or in a run-off in the U.S. House of
Representatives. 20 7 Andrew Jackson (1824) and Grover Cleveland (1888)
were plurality winners who lost the election. Jackson was defeated in the
House 20 8 and Cleveland in the electoral college. 20 9 Samuel J. Tilden
(1876) had a majority of the vote
as counted, but Benjamin Harrison was
210
college.
electoral
elected by the

206

The national popular vote has been counted starting since the election of 1824. The

"minority" winners were Adams (1824), Polk (1844), Taylor (1848), Buchanan (1856),
Lincoln (1860), Hayes (1876), Garfield (1880), Cleveland (1884 and 1892), Harrison
(1888), Wilson (1912 and 1916), Truman (1948), Kennedy (1960), Nixon (1968), and
Clinton (1992 and 1996); THOMAS H. MCKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND
PLATFORMS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES 1789 TO 1901; CONVENTION, POPULAR, AND

ELECTORAL VOTE 22-23, 56-57, 103-04, 118-19, 179-81, 198-200, 229-31, 287-89, 25759 (1901); EDWARD STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY FROM 1788 TO 1897,

134 (1916); Famighetti, supra note 2, at 502.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

207
208

JABEZ D. HAMMOND, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATE OF NEW

YORK FROM THE RAMIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION TO DECEMBER 1840, at

188-90 (1842); Everett S. Brown, The PresidentialElection of 1824-1825, POL. SCI.

Q.

384, 401 (1925); PAUL J. PICCARD, THE TWENTY-SEVENTY DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

MANUAL 129, 134-35; The Resolution of Electoral Deadlocks by the House of
Representatives, in I SELECTING THE PRESIDENT (Bower Aly ed. 1953).
209 Famighetti, supra note 2, at 502.
210 The electoral count of 1876-77 was contested and resolved with the help of an
ad hoc
commission. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE, AND POWERS 17871984, at 49 (5th ed. 1984); PAUL L. HAWORTH, THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTED
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876, at 236 (1906); DAVID A. MCKNIGHT, THE ELECTORAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 426 (1878); ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 705 (1935).
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The presidential electors chosen in November may decide to vote for a
loser of the popular vote or even for someone who was not on the original
ballot. The death of the Democrat's defeated presidential candidate,
Horace Greeley, between the popular and electoral votes in 1872 enabled
his electors to vote for different people.2 11 The death of the Republican's
vice presidential candidate just before the November election of 1912 had
been anticipated. 12 His electors were instructed by their party to vote for
Nicholas Butler.2 13 Some day, however, a winning November candidate
may be dead before the electors vote in December, thereby, precipitating
an unprecedented crisis.
Another aspect of the 1912 election, however, raises the possibility of
the election of a President by the electors on their own or in response to
instructions from their political parties. The Republican party nominated
William Howard Taft. Theodore Roosevelt bolted the party and ran as a
Progressive ("Bull Moose"). Woodrow Wilson won a majority of the
electors 2 14 and became President. If Wilson had won only a plurality short
of a majority, the combined Roosevelt and Taft electors would have been
a majority and they could have elected either Roosevelt (who ran second
in the popular vote), Taft (who
ran third), or someone else who had not
2 15
been a candidate in November.

How COULD SUCH ABERRATIONS OCCUR?

Electoral college arithmetic is bizarre. The popular vote in November
is counted state-by-state and in the District of Columbia. Close to 90
million votes are then collapsed into pockets of 1 to 54 votes each.
Nebraska 216 and Maine 217 each choose one elector by each congressional
district and two at large; California with 54 electors, like the rest of the
states, normally lumps all of them together. These unit votes produce
strange anomalies. For example, in 1996:218
Clinton
Popular

Clinton
Electora

Dole
Popular

Dole
Electoral

211 See York Wilbern, Discretionof PresidentialElectors, ALA. L. REv. 40, 43 (1948).
212 See HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 53
(1925); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., Reform of the ElectoralSystem, POL. SCI, Q. 1, 18 n.35
(1949).
213 Wilmerding, supra note 14, at 18 n.35. Apart from the renegade electors, the
deaths
of Horace Greeley and James Sherman (President Taft's original running mate) illustrate
the role electors can play.
214 Famighetti, supra note 2, at 502.
215 Id.
216 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 32-710 (1998).

217 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §
218 Famighetti, supra note 2, at 470.
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Vote

I Vote

Vote

Vote

Georgia

1,053,849

0

1,080,843

13

Rhode

233,050

4

104,683

0

1,286,899

4

1,185,526

13

Island
Totals

Trailing President Clinton by over 100,000 votes, Senator Dole
nevertheless gained 9 electoral votes. Such distortions may be repeated on
a national scale. That is what happened to Jackson," Tilden,2 2 ° and
Cleveland 22 1--and probably Richard Nixon in 1960. We examine this next.
The electoral college system not only distorted the popular vote in 1960,
as it tends to do, but it further skewed the results in Alabama, where the
names of individual candidates for elector were on the ballot. 22 Among
the candidates on the Democratic ticket were 6 unpledged candidates
opposed to the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, and 5 loyalists
who would vote for Kennedy.2 23 The biggest vote-getter among the
unpledged candidates received 324,050 votes; Kennedy's top elector
received 318,303. 224 Because these candidates appeared as Democrats on
the presidential ballot, votes cast for them were reported as votes for
Kennedy, which they were not.22 5 Had votes for the divided Alabama
Democrat electoral ticket been adjusted 5/1 Iths for Kennedy and 6/1 Iths
for the unpledged electors, the results in Alabama and nationally would
2 26
have appeared:
Adjusted

Reported
National

Adjusted
National

Nixon

34,108,546

34,108,157

237,981

Kennedy

34,227,096

34,049,976

147,295

a

Unpledged
Alabama
Plurality

176,755
Kennedy
118,550

Nixon
58,181

Nixon
61,226

219 BROWN, supra note 10, at 384.
221 Supra note 12.
221 Supra note 11.
222 Peirce, supra note 5, at 103-04 (accounting the difficulty of reporting the popular
vote

in Alabama in 1960). See that Peirce's figures sometimes differ marginally from those in
Famighetti.
223 [d.
224 [d.
225 [d.
2 26

Id. at 104.
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Reliance on state unit votes produces another problem. It greatly
exaggerates the importance of a few thousand votes in pivotal or
"battleground" states, especially if they are large. A bloc of a few
thousand honest votes may tip the balance in a key state. A corrupt count
of a relatively small number might accomplish the same result. Votes
which considered nationally would amount to a drop in the bucket, thus,
become critical.
A dramatic illustration of the importance of a few votes in a swing
state occurred in 1916.227 President Wilson received a popular vote
plurality of 594,186 votes and 277 electoral votes to 254 electoral votes
for Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican candidate.2 2 8 Ten states each
held Wilson's victory in their hands.
Wilson's
Plurality

Electoral
Votes

Alabama

70,847

12

California

3,773

13

Georgia

116,430

14

Kentucky

28,136

13

Missouri

28,693

18

North
Carolina

47,493

12

Ohio

90,408

24

Tennessee

36,766

12

Texas

222,561

20

Virginia

53,467

12

Nationally, Wilson had 594,186 more votes than Hughes, but his lead
of over a half million would have been wiped out by a switch of 1,887
popular votes
in California, or by the turnout of 3,774 more Republican
9
voters.

22

If the presidential election in 1916 had been conducted as a national
popular election, with 594,186 votes separating the candidates, 1,887
votes would not have mattered. What made such a small number
227

Paul J. Piccard, The Electoral Colleges of President Wilson,

UNIVERSITY STUDIES

FLORIDA STATE

No. 23, 29 (1956).

228 EDGAR E. ROBINSON, THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE:

1896-1932 (1947). See generally

Famighetti, supra note 2, at 502.
229 Id.; Piccard, supra note 29, at 45; Frederick M. Davenport, Did Hughes Snub
Johnson
[in California]?An Inside Story, AMERCAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Apr. 1949, at
321.
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important was the electoral college system and its nearly universal
reliance on state unit votes. We have looked at California because it is the
most dramatic, but a shift of less than 15,000 votes in either Kentucky or
Missouri that year would have had the same effect. A very few thousand
votes in a small number of key states can overturn a large national
plurality.
In addition to the distortions caused by the unit vote, of states or
congressional districts, further discrepancies result from the allocation of
two electors to each state regardless of size and the guarantee of at least
three per state. Alaska, with a population in 1990 of 550,043 has three
presidential electors; 2 30 Florida has about 23.5 times the population of
23 1 Thus, at the polls,
Alaska and about 8 times its electoral vote.
one
2 32
Alaskan is worth about three Californians.
People
Require
d
to
Equal
One
Alaskan

State

Population

Electoral
Votes

Alaska

550,043

3

1.0

California

29,785,857

54

2.9

Florida

12,938,071

25

2.8

Virginia

6,189,197

13

2.5

On the other hand, eleven big states plus any two more electoral votes
elsewhere can elect the President despite the vote in the rest of the
country. Those big states might each give one candidate a small plurality,
much smaller than a majority, but their electors would out vote even
lopsided majorities for the loser in all the other states. We have 538
electors with only 270 needed to win. The eleven largest states and their
electoral vote are:
California

54

New York

33

Texas

32

Florida

25

Pennsylvania

23

230

231 Famighetti, supra note 2, at 500.
232

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Illinois

22

Ohio
Michigan

21
18

New Jersey

15

Virginia
Massachusetts

13
12

Eleven-State
Subtotal

268233

Thus, the eleven largest states plus two more electoral votes may reach
the magic number, 270. Eleven states and the District of Columbia could
out vote the rest of the nation.
Such are the vagaries of electoral college arithmetic. November's
winner could be December's loser. Under other circumstances,
December's third-place candidate could be elected President of the United
States by the U.S. House of Representatives. We now turn our attention to
the imbroglio that would ensue in the House.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Twelfth Amendment is the controlling law when the presidential
electors fail to produce a majority. The election is thrown into the House
of Representatives. The House then votes by states rather than by
members. The quorum is234
two-thirds of the states and twenty-six states are
victory.
for
now required
Typically, a few states have delegations evenly divided between
Republicans and Democrats. 35 As long as party lines hold, these states
would lose their vote and twenty-six states would still be required to elect
the President. In many state delegations, the state's vote is held at the
mercy of one Representative who might deadlock the state's
delegation or
2 36
opposition.
the
to
state
the
give
who in other cases might

233
234

See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

235

If a state delegation is evenly divided, each Representative is able to give the state to
the opposition by abstaining. With a margin of one, any Representative in the majority
can deadlock the state by abstaining or give the state to the opposition by switching sides.
With a margin of two, any Representative in the majority can deadlock the state by
switching.
236

http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/4
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The composition of the House of Representatives in the future cannot
be predicted but the experience of the past illustrates the problems. The
elections of 1800 and 1824 were decided in the House of
Representatives.2 3 7 The elections of 1912,238 1924,239 and 1948240
involved major third-party candidates. A comfortable majority in241the
House, as in 1995, does not guarantee a majority of state delegations.

Numbers of States/Representatives in Critical Position*
Tied
States/Reps

Margin of
1
States/Rep

Margin of
2
States/Rep

S

S

Totals
States/Reps

1801

2/10

3/5

3/10

8/25

1825

0/0

7/13

2/20

9/33

1913

3/12

10/12

5/10

18/34

1925

4/22

8/31

6/17

18/70

1949

3/10

7/38

13/50

23/98

1995

6/54

12/40**

9/31

27/125

*A single Representative in a "critical position" could change the vote of a
state.
"*Not counting the one Independent Representative from Vermont. He
could not move his state from one party to the other, nor could he give it
to one party by abstaining, but he could give it to either party.

Jefferson finally prevailed in 1801 when some Federalists abstained.2 42
In 1825, John Quincy Adams needed every one of his 13 state delegations,
including Maryland and New York.24 3 In each of those two states, a
244
wavering Representative had to be held in line.

237 Famighetti, supra note 2, at 502.
238 CONCISE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY
239

240

143 (Wayne Andrews ed. 1962).

Id. at 145-46.

241 THEODORE W.

94 (1947);

COUSENS, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TN AMERICA

EDWARD STANWOOD,

A HISTORY OF

THE PRESIDENCY

93-

71-72; PICCARD, supra

note 10, at 132-35; Famighetti, supra note 2, at 81-87.
242 STANWOOD, supra note 43, at
71.
243 COUSENS, supra note 43, at 93; STANWOOD, supra note 43,
at 71.
244 One was Stephen Van Rensselaer from New York; the other Henry R. Warfield
from
Maryland. Hammond, supra note 10, at 190; Brown, supra note 10, at 402; Peirce, supra

note 5, at 85.
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If we assume that party lines would have held in four other
illustrations of the composition of the House of Representatives, at least
for a first ballot, the results would have been:

Democrat

1913
23

1925
21

1949
25

1995
20

Republican

22

23

20

23

4

3

6

-

-

1

Divided
(lost vote)
Independent

-

Only in 1949 did one party have a nominal majority. However, the
Democrats that year had only 21 states whose electors voted for President
Truman. 4 5 The other four "Democrat" states had cast their electoral votes
for J. Strom Thurmond, the States Rights ("Dixiecrat") candidate.2 46 Ifthe
Dixiecrats had cast their votes in the House for Thurmond, the election
would have been deadlocked. At that point any one of 98 Representatives,
acting alone, could have changed the state tally. Eventually, we suppose,
*247
as in 1801,
some of them would have abstained or switched parties in
order to elect a President. Our supposition, however, is a flimsy
foundation on which to construct a presidency. If the House failed to
resolve the matter, the Senate would choose a Vice President
who would
"act as President until a President shall have qualified. 2 48
The election of 1994 gave the House Republicans a comfortable
majority of 230-204 but as is often the case, the majority party did not
have a majority of the state delegations.2 49 We imagine considerable
turmoil between November's election and the eventual action by the
House of Representatives the following January; perhaps the presidential
electors would intervene in December. This possibility will be considered
next.

INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS

Presidential electors are bound by some state laws and certainly by the
spirit of the Constitution, but they do have some freedom to act on their
245 Piccard, supra note 10, at 133-34.
246

Id.

at 134.

Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

Providing for the Election of President and Vice-President, Sen. Rpt. 602, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949).
247 Cousens, supra note 43, at 94; Stanwood, supra note 43, at 71-72.
248 U.S. CONST. amend. XX,
§ 3.
249
See THE WORLD ALMANAC 1995, 78-85.

http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/4
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own, 25 in concert with others, or under the direction of their political

parties. 251 We have had some renegade electors and their votes have been
counted.
Many people, including jurists,2 52 have argued that the "original intent"
of the Constitution was to have independent, presumably wise, electors

choose the President. However, the best scholarship on the topic is
weighted the other way.2 53 The electoral college system was pushed

through the Constitutional Convention of 1787 by the proponents of a
popular election for the presidency who saw it as the best way to elect
George Washington. 254 Popular election was impossible because of the
widely varying state suffrage qualifications and exacerbated by the

political necessity of allowing the slave states to count three-fifths of their
slaves. 255 The electoral college solved these problems by incorporating the

Three-Fifths Compromise. This gave each state the same number of
electoral votes that it had
for Representatives and Senators regardless of
2 56
the size of its electorate.
Arguments about the framers' intent were mooted by the adoption of
the Twelfth Amendment in 1804. The electors in the preceding elections
showed no signs of independence, except for Samuel Miles of
Pennsylvania. 257 The election of 1800 demonstrated rigid political party
domination of electors, so that the choice of the voters or state legislatures
would be carried out.258 The authors of the Twelfth Amendment, and the
state legislatures that ratified it, understood how the system worked with
the original language of Article II of the Constitution. By 1800, if not
before, that language described partisan electors who did the bidding of
the voters or legislatures who "appointed ' 259 them.
250 Wilbern, supra note 13, at 43.
251 Id. Apart from renegade electors, the deaths of Horace Greeley and James
Sherman

(President Taft's original running mate) illustrate a role the electors can play.
252 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,. 232 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating
that the
electoral "plan originally contemplated ... that electors would be free agents, to exercise
an independent and nonpartisan judgment ....).
253 See Paul J. Piccard, JOURNAL OF POL., May 1959, at 324 (reviewing
Lucius
Wilmerding, Jr., The Electoral College (1958)).
254 At the Constitutional Convention Washington was "the man universally expected to
be the first President .... " Andrews, supra note 39, at 759; Piccard, supra note 54, at
324.
255 James Madison in the Constitutional Convention, July 25, 1787. Tansill, supra note
1, at 451.
256 U.S. CONST. Art.

II, § 2.
257 Peirce, supra note 5, at 107.
251 State legislatures chose the electors in 6 states in 1789,
10 states in 1792 and 1796,

and 11 states in 1800. Voters in districts or at large generally elected electors in other
states, but with some variations. Stanwood, supra note 43, at n.22; McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 Y.S. 1 (1892).
259 U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2 (quoting "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the
legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors ....
") (emphasis added).
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Even so, the idea of independent electors persisted and took on new
life as conservatives, especially in the South, resented the liberal programs
of the New Deal in the 1930s. This group also opposed the civil rights
movement of that era and opposed its place in the Democratic Party
platform of 1948.260 So far these efforts have been limited to protest votes
cast by electors opposed to the likes of Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy,
and Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan received one electoral vote from the
state of Washington in 1976 and Lloyd Bentsen got one from West
Virginia in 1968.
The largest defection was Senator Harry F. Bird's 15 electoral votes in
1960. He received fourteen votes from unpledged electors in Alabama
and Mississippi and one vote from Harry D. Irwin, a disaffected
264
Republican in Oklahoma, who "could not stomach" Richard Nixon.
Between the popular vote in November and the electoral vote in
December, "Alabama's six unpledged electors met in Birmingham and
announced their desire to cast their Presidential vote 'for an outstanding
Southern Democrat who sympathizes with our peculiar problems in the
South.' They stated that 'our position remains fluid so that we can
cooperate with other
unpledged electors for the preservation of racial and
265
national integrity."'

The unpledged Alabama electors then met with the those 7 in
Mississippi and agreed to vote for Senator Byrd.266 They tried to recruit
support from pledged Southern electors. 267 Their "stated hope [backed by
Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett and Louisiana White Citizens Council
leaders].

. .

was that if the election reached the House, all Southerners

would vote for Byrd and that the Republicans, 'being fundamentally
268
opposed to the liberalism of Senator Kennedy,' would follow suit."
Harry Irwin of Oklahoma also tried to recruit support for the cause. He
telegraphed his fellow Republican electors, stating that, "sufficient
conservative Democratic electors available to deny labor Socialist
nominee."2 69 These Southerners were invoking the letter of the law to
frustrate the spirit of the law.

260

Platform: Southern Exodus, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1948, at 4.

261 Famighetti, supra note 2, at 502.
262 [d.
263 [d.
264 Peirce, supra note 5, at 107.
265

Id. at 106.

266

[d.

267 Id.
268 Id.
269

[d.
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Senator Bird's 15 electoral votes form the precedent for a larger
movement by electors away from the nominees of their parties. The
situation, when it develops, will be unique. Under the Twelfth
Amendment 2 70 the electoral college has failed to produce a majority only
once. We accomplish little by trying to imagine the circumstances but,
however they develop, they will produce at least a three-way split of the
electoral vote, probably with a regional base for one of the candidates.
In the past the potential for an electoral college failure has come from
the Progressive Party as manifested by Theodore Roosevelt (1912),
Robert M. La Follette (1924), and Henry A. Wallace (1948), and from the
candidacies of J. Strom Thurmond (1948), George C. Wallace (1968),
John B. Anderson (1980), and H. Ross Perot (1992 and 1996).
Theodore Roosevelt had sufficient strength in enough states to win 88
electoral votes,2 7 ' while La Follette drew only 13 electors.27 2 In 1948,
Strom Thurmond's appeal was regional and provided 39 votes. 273 Henry
Wallace had almost as many popular votes as Thurmond that year
(1,157,172 to 1,269,021),274 but his were scattered and provided no
electoral votes. Likewise Perot's nearly 20 million popular votes the first
time and over 8 million the second bore no fruit. 275 Now we can imagine a
strong showing by a third candidate, but our crystal ball is too cloudy to
reveal the future turmoil that may persuade presidential electors to set
aside the November election and avoid having the House of
Representatives fulfill its constitutional role of tie breaker. A third party
with a strong presidential candidate, but with few, if any seats in
Congress, might be especially tempted to short-circuit the system.
We have been considering some unwanted developments: a failure of
the electoral college, a fiasco in the House of Representatives, and a runaway group of presidential electors. Can the time bomb ticking down to
one of these possibilities be defused?

PROPOSED REMEDIES

The simplest solution to all these problems is (1) abolition of the
whole electoral college system, getting rid not only of the human electors
but also of the artificial state votes representing each state's congressional
delegation. This would raise some other problems and many objections.
See id. at 83-84; see also Famighetti, supra note 2, at 500 (noting that no candidate
pulled a majority in 1822).
271 Famighetti, supra ntoe 2, at 502.
270

272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
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Some middle ground reforms include: (2) abolishing the electors but
retaining the assigned state vote, (3) abolish the electors, retain the
assigned state vote, but divide that vote in the same ratio as the state's
popular vote, (4) requiring the states to choose electors by district voting,
(5) abolishing the electoral college majority requirement so that a plurality
would produce a winner, or (6) allowing the House of Representatives to
vote by members instead of by states if called upon to choose the
President.
All of these proposals run up against a fundamental political principle:
Those in power do not like change. However poorly the system works in
the future the sitting President and White House staff will owe their
positions to the existing system. From their perspective they may
reasonably conclude that despite all the objections, from their perspective
the system works.
(1) Popular election of the President. One problem with popular
election is that we would sometimes lose the fiction of a majority winner.
276
In 1860 President Lincoln had only 40 percent of the popular vote.
Wilson had 42 percent in 1912.277 John Quincy Adams, Polk, Taylor,
Buchanan, Hayes, Garfield, Cleveland twice, Benjamin Harrison, Wilson
again in 1916, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon in 1968, and Clinton twice were
minority presidents. 278 Americans could pretend that these minority
Presidents had a stronger mandate than was the case.
Another objection may also be viewed as an advantage. The present
system bestows extraordinary influence on small blocs of votes in key
states. People who profit from these votes would be reluctant to see them
folded into the larger national pool of votes where all votes would be
equal.
(2) Abolish the human electors but keep the state unit vote. This
reform would solve only a small part of the problem 279 and might not be
worth a constitutional amendment. It would guarantee that any failure to
produce a majority would go to the House of Representatives. We would
also lose the possibility of dealing with the death of a candidate, as
electors now might have between the votes of November and December.
(3) Divide the states' electoral votes in the same ratio as the popular
vote. This proposal has come the closest to adoption by Congress. As
276 See supra note 8.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279

It would preclude the possibility of a conspiracy between the November and

December votes to override the results of the general election.
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passed by the Senate in 1950 it provided for calculating each state's vote
to three decimal places. More recent versions have relied on whole votes
or fractions of one-tenth. 280 This reform would reduce the electoral vote to
a close approximation of the popular vote but it raises the specter of
admitting that we have minority Presidents. It also would suffer from its
perceived role in dividing the states' votes in proportion to the popular
vote. American politicians committed to the two-party system quiver at
the sound of the word "proportion." This is true even when only one
officer is being elected by the vote and so cannot be divided into pieces in
proportion to anything.
Opponents of popular election and its approximation
through the
28 1
parties.
splinter
of
fear
a
express
votes
state
of
splitting
The present system seems to provide more incentive for small,
minority parties, like the States Rights Party of 1948, than would a general
election. In a nation-wide election the splinters are too small to
accomplish very much. With the electoral college they can threaten real
mischief.
Another objection to the splitting of state votes into fractions is that a
political party with a solid grip on a state or region would get nearly all
the electoral votes, while parties with smaller pluralities elsewhere would
get only their minority fractions of the vote. The absence of key swing
blocs of votes, as with national popular elections, also raises objections
from beneficiaries of today's distortions of the popular vote. Finally,
explaining to nearly half the voters that their candidate lost the election at
some decimal place could be a problem.
(4) Require district elections. Reducing the size of unit votes from as
many as California's fifty-four down to a single vote would bring the
popular and electoral votes closer but as we see from the British example,
it would not solve the problem of a popular plurality winner losing the
election in the electoral college.
The British use 659 electors (Members of Parliament) to choose the
Prime Minister 282 but there, too, carrying lots of constituencies by small
margins has provided a majority in the House of Commons despite the
opposition's overall lead in the total national vote. Thus, choosing
280
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282 Facts About the British Prime Minister (xiv. 1995). In 1997 the Labour [sic] Party
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presidential electors by districts might mitigate the effects of state unit,
votes but the problem of distortion would remain.
(5) Abolish the majority requirement. The closest we have come to
abolishing the majority requirement has been a proposal to require forty
percent of the decimalized (ratio) electoral vote. 28 3The problem seems
insurmountable in debate, but voters faced with a single member
constituency, like the presidency, normally coalesce into two opposing
camps on their own. 284 Minnesota elected a low-percentage governor in
1998,285 but most governors, United States Senators, and others get either
a majority or a large plurality (not necessarily a large margin but anyway
close to a majority) without any constitutional requirement for a majority.
Ironically, requiring 40 percent might encourage spoilers who would
otherwise have less incentive to siphon off votes without that requirement.
When the South was a one-party region, the problem was solved by
having a run-off primary election. Few people wish to face a run-off
presidential election. 28 6 Run-offs have the disadvantage of pitting the
extremes against each other when the voters might prefer a middle-ground
compromise candidate.
(6) Allow the House of Representatives to vote by members. Since the
election has not been sent to the House since 1825, and since few people
are worried about the scenario of the ticking bomb (our readers now
excepted), this proposal has no drive behind it. It would, however, be a
great improvement over the present system with its huge number of
Representatives each sitting in the catbird seat. The small states would
still be over-represented but we would not have the possibility of the 26
smallest states, with about 17 percent of the nation's population, and only
73 Representatives out of 435, out-voting the 24 largest states and the
District of Columbia.

CONCLUSION

The American political system is always changing. Our political
parties are being transformed and marginalized. Some people have already
taken advantage of the letter of the law of presidential electors to
manipulate the electoral vote as a protest. The worst possibilities
considered above are no longer as remote as they were. We can subscribe
283 See "Lucas Amendment" to the "Lodge-Gossett" Amendment, Cong. Rec. 81st Cong.,

2d Sess. 10426, 10427 (1950). This proposal was adopted by the Senate but never went
to the States for ratification because it failed to pass the House of Representatives.
284 MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVITY IN

THE MODERN STATE (trans. 1955); THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 311

(Marian D. Irish & James W. Prothro summaries 1959).
285

286 Dyckman, supra note 7, at 3D.
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to the proposition, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." However, when we see
the warning signs of a breakdown we can do some heavy preventive
maintenance. The electoral college system, with its overemphasis on
large, swing states already misshapes our presidential campaigns. It
promises to do much worse when the ticking bomb goes off.
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